



PROBLEMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AS A CONCEPTUALLY DISTINGUISHABLE MULTIPLICITY

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Annotation

The article is devoted to understanding the problematic nature of research in the field of philosophy of science. A definition of the concept of the philosophy of science is proposed, based on the understanding of its involvement in the historical context of the tradition of thinking of being. The philosophy of science is understood as a historically determined process and the result of the systematic application of the entire semantic potential of philosophy to the understanding of the phenomenon of science, the history of science. On this basis, it is argued that the conceptually distinguishable and historically determined multiplicity of problems of the philosophy of science presupposes such subsets as the problems of the metaphysics of science and the problems of non-metaphysical discourse regarding the nature of science, the problems of ontology and epistemology of science, axiology, methodology and praxeology of scientific research.

Keywords: concept of philosophy of science, metaphysics of science, non-metaphysical philosophy of science, ontology of science, epistemology of science, axiology of science, methodology of science, praxeology of science.

Introduction

Understanding the specifics of the problematic nature of research in the field of philosophy of science is necessary for the self-determination of this already historical tradition. The definition of the concept of the philosophy of science, based on the understanding of its involvement in the historical context of the tradition of thinking of being, opens up prospects for a conceptually meaningful universalization of philosophical studies of the nature of science.

In the light of the historical experience of the tradition of thinking of being, the philosophy of science can be understood as a historically determined process and the result of the systematic application of the entire semantic potential of philosophy to comprehend the phenomenon of science, the history of science. This conventionally proposed definition of the philosophy of science has specific implications. In the context of the tradition of thinking of being, formed in ancient Greece and continuing for the third millennium, such methods of its implementation as metaphysics and





non-metaphysical discourse, ontology, epistemology and axiology, methodology and praxeology took shape. In their structures, the historically conceptually distinguishable plurality of problems of the tradition of thinking of being predetermines the differentiated integrity of meanings that determine the possibilities of comprehending certain areas of the experience of human being in the world. This also applies to understanding the historical experience of scientific knowledge. Consequently, the multiplicity of problems of philosophy presupposes such subsets of the problems of the philosophy of science as the problems of the metaphysics of science and the problems of non-metaphysical discourse regarding the nature of science, the problems of the ontology of science and the epistemology of science, the axiology of science, the methodology and praxeology of scientific research.

The Renaissance in Central Asia resulted in the greatest achievements in the political, economic and spiritual life of society. During this period, political and legal sciences, new literature and art, medicine, philosophy, and a new aesthetic consciousness were created.

The history of the tradition of thinking of being was, in a certain sense, the history of the relationship between metaphysical and non-metaphysical discourses. Since metaphysics was comprehended by its adherents as the semantic center of theoretical philosophy, insofar as the definition of its meaning is significant for understanding philosophy, ontology, epistemology, axiology, methodology and praxeology.

The position is argued, according to which the metaphysics of science in a certain sense can be understood as a predecessor of the epistemology of science. The metaphysics of science in this version deals with the unobservable parts of the world described by scientific theories, and the epistemology of science is relegated to the evaluation of the specific methods used to generate scientific statements in order to justify them. The influence of the anti-metaphysical orientation of critical positivism, logical positivism, and logical empiricism led to the elimination of metaphysical problems that arise when discussing the arguments of scientific realism. Understanding the principles of realistic interpretation of scientific cognition and knowledge correlates with the need for explication of metaphysical meanings that play the role of semantic contexts for the cognitive activity of scientists. The conviction of modern philosophers of science that the premises of scientific realism can provide a conceptually self-consistent movement of scientific knowledge collide with the arguments of an anti-realistic, instrumentalist approach to the problems of the philosophy of science. The answers of various concepts to questions that constitute the subject matter of the philosophy of science are debatable. The ontological





question is the question of a reality that exists independently of consciousness. The semantic question is whether the meanings of the theory can be interpreted literally. The epistemological question is about scientific knowledge. A. Chakravarti reconstructed the answers to these questions, which were given from the positions, respectively, of realism, constructive empiricism, skepticism, logical positivism (logical empiricism), traditional instrumentalism and idealism. Realism answers all three questions in the affirmative. Constructive empiricism answers positively the ontological and semantic question. The answers to the epistemological question are differentiated: knowledge is possible about the observed, but not about the unobservable. Skepticism answers positively to ontological and semantic questions. The answer to the epistemological question turns out to be negative. Logical positivism (logical empiricism) finds it difficult (refrains) from answering the ontological question. The answers to the semantic question are differentiated: it is possible to interpret the meanings of the theory literally about the observable, but not about the unobservable. The answer to the epistemological question is yes. Traditional instrumentalism gives a positive answer to the ontological question. The answers to the semantic question are differentiated: it is possible to interpret the meanings of the theory literally about the observable, but not about the unobservable. The answers to the epistemological question are also differentiated: there is knowledge about the observed, but not about the unobservable. Idealism gives negative answers to ontological and semantic questions, the answer to the epistemological question is positive. The essence of the metaphysics of science is proposed to be expressed from the standpoint of realism in the theses that in its context, phenomena are explained in terms of the language of things that underlie the observed. This necessarily suggests certain speculations about the unobservable. The critical attitude of empiricism in this case is expressed through the negation of these theses of the metaphysics of science. His positive attitude is reduced to the perception of the methods of science itself as a model used to study the problems of the philosophy of science.

Understanding the problematic nature of research in the field of philosophy of science, based on understanding its involvement in the historical context of the tradition of thinking being, opens up opportunities for the systematic application of philosophy to the understanding of science. If the philosophy of science is understood as a historically determined process and the result of the systematic application of the entire semantic potential of philosophy to understanding the phenomenon of science, the history of science, then there is no temptation to reduce its problems to one of the sections of philosophy. Or in other words: the conceptually distinct and historically





defined multiplicity of problems of the philosophy of science presupposes such subsets as the problems of the metaphysics of science and the problems of non-metaphysical discourse regarding the nature of science, the problems of the ontology and epistemology of science, the axiology, methodology and praxeology of scientific research.

List of Used Literature

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