GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT ANTHROPONOMY. THE THEORY OF PROPER AND COMMON NAMES

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Annotation. This article is devoted to the study of anthroponomy which discusses scientific and semantical importance of names. In addition, it gives information about specific features of names and linguocultural characteristics.

Key words: anthroponomy, toponomy, semantic, scientific, proper names.

Main Part

Proper names is a word or ground of words recognized as indicating or tending to indicate the object or objects to which it refers by virtue of its distinctive sound alone, without regard to any meaning possessed by that sound alone, without the start or acquired by it through association with said object or objects.

One of the two largest classes of proper names is that which provides designation for places for continents countries, provinces, towns, villages and even private residences, not to speak of expanses of water, mountains, promontories, and so forth. In this class all the four conditions mentioned above come into play, but with different deserving if comment. There are but flu localities in the world so different from the rest that they eschew proper names and are habitually represented by brief descriptions; indeed can instance only the similarity of the entities named there is not that degree which exists between the starts as seen by a terrestrial observer, but it would be a grievous misrepresentation of my point if someone objected that the Mediterranean and London have nothing in common except that both are localities. When the sea is compared with sea and town with town the difficulty of selecting features characteristic enough to serve as the basis for differentiating descriptions will be appreciated to the full. The fact that places change from century is another reason for giving them immutable names of their own to emphasize their continuity, though this case of proper names exercises less influence in place names than it does in names of persons. The interest without which no place would be given a name does not spring from exactly the same kind of source as the interest that prompted the naming of the

stars. There the needs of mariners and of these concerned with the measurement of time have co-operated with the scientific preoccupation of a small beady of specialists. As regards places, there is scarcely anyone without a home or haunt of his own which is a vital distance places varies greatly and in the majority of cases is simply non-existent.

Anthroponym determines a certain personality from the great quantity of people. This statement is very deep because it takes lots of peculiarities of the determined subjects and also the speaker's attitude to the surrounding world. The origin history of the proper names is closely connected with culture and ideology of society where they are used. This aspect interprets the fact that anthroponyms are frequently used in proverbs and in fiction texts. So, the problem of the article lies in the great functional potential of anthroponyms. Anthroponyms have the function of the connection between a man and his surrounding world or society in common. Every personality lives among people who have their own names. Every such a name creates a certain continuum or certain national and cultural area that is common for all the language collective but it is individual for every its representative. Studying anthroponomy systems of different European countries, we may notice the same out features that include the same elements, namely it is the presence of a proper name and a surname. But there are lots of differences in other cases because every anthroponomy system is the unique phenomenon in all ontological aspects of determining of anthroponyms. For example, the anthroponomy model in the Ukrainian language consists of a name and patronymic. The English model consists of three components that include a first name, second name and surname. The German anthroponomy model consists of two components, they are name and surname that may be multi component. Anthroponym is the device of person's identification as the special form of communication. In different spheres of life (at work, in the family, in the rest time) the parallel models of names are used. They are determined by national and cultural features of the communicational behavior, the person's preference to a certain referent group and also the by a social role. Anthroponyms play a big role in the studying of culture and history of a certain country. In the ground of the anthroponomy lies the literature ono- mastics that has become very popular last years because modern science about the language has the anthropocentric direction. Anthroponyms used in fiction texts serve as the object of learning of poetical and literary onomastics. The studying of literary onomastics has begun not long ago. Magazanyk Y. has noticed that it is hard to imagine the proper name that priori plays a great literary and esthetic role because its role in the language is quiet poor. The functions of names in the society are determined by social needs. It means that all the

functions of proper names are social because they are realized only in social and speech situations. According to Superanskaya A. social legalization of personality is one of the main functions of anthroponyms. Proper names serve likely as the national symbols, namely they realize the function of the ethnic symbol that point the belonging of native speakers to a certain ethnic group. Many researchers point out the informative function of anthroponyms. The fiction prose doesn't reflect the real conditions of life but it copies different social phenomena including the use of anthroponyms. Proper name belongs to one of the main elements in the process of creating the images in fiction texts. The difference between the proper names of real communication and those of a fiction text lies in the fact that the proper names of a fiction text are created for the concrete hero taking into account his character, social state etc. So, the proper names in the fiction text play as well as the function of identification as the function of creation of the fiction image of a certain hero.

For this reason, most places are for him —mere names. Again, it accords well with Mill`s view of the meaningless of proper names that peace names can prove serviceable with only a minimum of knowledge. When a railway – journey is being planned one does not stop to inquire details about the junctions at which one has to change, nor is more information required in giving an address than to specify the larger and smaller regions within which the particular place is located. The interest that different persons display in a given place is apt to be extremely heterogeneous and the virtue of a proper name is that, since it embraces the whole of its object, it caters to all requirements without bias in any direction. It is superfluous to waste words over the utility of peace-names in locating other peace's than those designated by them; the postman and the pedestrian are here the best witnesses.

It would be tedious to cover the same ground again in reference to personal names the largest class of all. Still it is worth pointing out that there is no human being so wretched as to have no name of his own, and yet the great majority of people whom we meet in the streets of a city are of supreme indifference to us. What is more they look alike or at all events the distinguishing marks are not conspicuous enough for the individuality of each to be unsold by words more meaningful than proper names. It is of importance for the theory of personal names that these accompany their owners, as a rule, from the cradle to the grave and consequently identify these owners at every conceivable stage and in every situation. Indeed, we may pertinently note that a personality sometimes under does temporary case of girls who many or prominent men when elevated to the peerage. Thus, much having been said it may seem profitable to discuss a few special problems and traits in connation with persons and their names. Perhaps someone might think fit to ask why the name of some almost

universally known person, like Napoleon or Shakespeare does not lose its quality of being a proper name as a consequence of acquiring meaning and becoming a household word. We can picture some reader objecting. —If your hypothesis concerning sun and moon is correct, why does not the name napoleon present itself to us as a common noun seeing that here, if anywhere, the mind travels right through the sound to use meaning? But does it? For the generality of mankind, and it is they who confer their meaning upon words, when the sun`s roundness, and brightness and warmth and a few other traits have been enumerated the meaning of the sun is practically entrusted. With a personal name like Napoleon it is far otherwise. Whole books are required to set forth the meaning of Napoleon and what the bearer of the name has signified to his contemporaries and to later durations. The meaning of his name by no means confines itself to those traits that have brought him celebrity. His childhood, his experience as a lover his life at St. Helena has all to be bought into the account. Another reason which would suffice to uphold the position of Napoleon amid the ranks of proper names is what we have proposed to case the Law of Serial Uniformity; this is at button only a manifestation of the generalizing tendency of the human mind which assimilates phenomena with a variant disregard of the differences that may exist between them. All persons have names of their own, and napoleon is the name is the great Corsican. And that name cannot fail to be regarded by the linguistic consciousness as a proper name, no matter how much more significant it may be to the public at large than that of any ordinary person.

Let us next ask how far designations like Cook and Father, when employed as vocatives or as means of reference, can be considered to be proper names. They resemble these not having the article prefixed to them. Here we cannot avail ourselves of the antithesis between Language and Speech which stood us in good stead when dealing with examples like a Goethe. We cannot say that Cook is a mere phenomenon of speech, for within the limited circle where the word serves as substitute for a mere adios momentary application; it may indeed be sterilized for years in a family as the recognized designation of the same person. The grammarian must here forge a nomenclature that das justice to the special case and A should proper to classify Cook, when thus employed, as a common noun adopted (not rarely used) as a proper name. The conception of a proper name as liable to gradations becomes imperative in such instances. Usually Father is still less of a real proper name than Cook, since except when the other parent imitates the parlance of fur off spring. Father is employed only by chose to which its bearer stands in the paternal relation. We pass over the interesting topic of nicknames, but it is necessary that something should be said about examples like Richard be Spicer and Robert le long, quoted from a medieval roll by

weekly to illustrate the way in which common English surnames originated. Here it would be fitting, in my opinion to say that Spicer and Long are already proper names in as much as their bearers or else the community in which they lived had evidently be the official means of establishing their identity. Naturally the Spicer had every incentive to advertise his trade and it would be wrongheaded to suppose that he without the meaning of that epithet to be ignored. But Richard le Spicer my possibly have been long of limb and its by no means certain that Robert le Long was not a Spicer. The fact that Richard took le Spicer and not any applicable attribute to be his epithet on constants plainly confers on le Specer the right to be considered a questionable than Dartmouth a name of long standing in which the meaning doubtless seldom comes to consciousness.

A number of other categories of proper names can be dealt with very rapidly, since only in one particular do, they teach us anything new. All ships and boats receive proper names of their own on account of the commercial and other interest which they possess for their owners, though not necessary for the community at large. Houses are not quite so universally accorded this means of distinction, since temporary tenants can feel little objection to their peace of residence being identified by a number. The effective motive here comes into view. The man who builds a new house for himself or unexpectedly becomes the proud possessor of one is specially apt to mark his satisfaction by choosing a name for it, and the name chosen is likely to recall some scene of the name giver`s previous activity or to reflect some subject of peculiar interest to him. The like holds good of the naming of animals, pets, and indeed any object of human pride or affection. We pass on to more dubious cases. An eminent French philologist has claimed that the names of birds which he personally is unable to identify on sight are in reality proper names.

As previously remarked, personal ignorance of the meaning of a bird and this is a failing for which everyone out to feel the greatest sympathy can carry no weight in determining its categorization. To what category a word belongs is decided by the linguistic feeling of those best acquainted with the object and the manner of its reference although the grammarian and dictionary makes must be invoked to find the technical term appropriate to the definition of the feelings. Now everyone who knows that linnets and corn-erases and shakes and whinchats are birds, and that these are ordinary English designations of them subconsciously peace those designations in the same category as sparrow and truth, and no one with grammatical knowledge will daunt that sparrow and trash are common names. External evidence for this is found in the use of the articles and the formation of plurals without any sense of incongruence. If whinchat is felt to be more of a proper name than sparrow it is

because a proper name is merely a word in which one feature common to all words what so over the power of conveying distinctions by means of distinctive sounds – is discerned in its purest form and our attention is drawn to the distinctive sound or writing (which is merely sound translated into another medium) more urgently in the case as a rare word than in that of a common one. None the less we think a good case may be out for regarding the scientific Latin names of birds and plants as more of proper names than their common English equivalents. The name Brassica rape easily evokes the thought of a botanist classifying a number of specimens which to the lay mind. Are much alike, and to one of which he gives the name. Brassica rape just as apparent names his baby. We Brassica rape is simple the scientific name for the ordinary turnip. We may find confirmatory support for regarding Brassica rapa as a proper name, or at least as much mire of a proper name than turnip, in the fact that we do not say. This is a Brassica rapa or these are Brassica rapas though we might say these are fine specimens of Brassica rapa. In so saying we appeal to the name of any single example of the type whereas in speaking of a certain vegetable as a turnip we appeal to the similarity of that vegetable to others of its kind. The difference of linguistic attitude is a rare nuance, but it is a real one. In the one instance the sound of the name what we usually describe as‖ the name itself‖ is more in the foreground than in the other insurance.

Whether or we no classify the Latin names of plants, and animals as a proper names admittedly they are borderline cases it`s undeniable that in fact those names refer to things existent in great number. If the contention of the last paragraph be deemed worthy of consideration, it is inevitable that the debate should be existence to the months and of the days of the week should be regarded as proper names is one of much interest, since different languages take different lines about it is a symptom that may be employed as evidence if care be taken not to attach over much importance to it. The French write jeudi and janivier where we write Thursday and January, and we believe we are right in saying that most French grammarians would not admit month-names are also general names is clear from the facility and lack of strain felt in toes les jeidis (note the article and the plural ending) and in miss. Brawn is at home on Thursday.

Nevertheless, there are details of usage, i.e. jurdi le 15 mars which seem to place these names on a different footing from other common nouns. If the problem be stated in another way, it seems likely that the same men and Englishman. If we were to ask: –Which of the two words hiver (winter) and Decembre (December) is more of a proper name than the others? it would probably be admitted than the latter would have the preference. The reason is both obvious and interesting. The stretches of time

indicated by the names of the seasons are felt to be more contrasted in their nature than those indicated may be much of a machine, but there is an unmistakable difference between the seasons. Consequently, in the names of the seasons the meaning plays a greater part in marking the distinction than is played by the meaning attaching to the month names, and the latter correspondingly the distinctive name, the distinctive word-sound, exercises a more important role of indicating the period meant. The month name is for that reasons more of a proper name than the name of the season. It is a peculiarity of the months and the days of the week that a fixed order belongs to their meaning. It is undeniable that Wednesday implies the Day after Tuesday and that before Thursday. Still that do modicum of constant meaning does not compensate for the fact that the other characters of the day designated by the name Wednesday are variable intangible and differ from person, so that the name itself is the only thing which we can cling to in order to uphold the distinction between one day and another.

It is superfluous to discuss feast days like Easter, Whitsunday, Lupercalia. To the Englishman at all events the names of these are proper names, though on account of their recurring every year they must join the ranks of the −common proper name. A proper name is a word that if answers the purpose of showing a what thing it is that we are talking about writes John Stuart Mill in A System of Logic, but not of talking anything about it. The problem of defining proper names, and of explaining their meaning, is one of the most recalcitrant in modern philosophy. Mill's definition is as good as any, though it is ultimately not helpful. A proper name tells us which thing is in question, without giving us any other information about it. But how does it do this? What exactly is the nature of this information?

There are two puzzles in particular;

1. The name is some way reveals the identity of the object. An identity statement, such as " Hesperus= Phosphorus" should contain no information at all. If we understand the names, we should understand the information they carry, namely the identity of their bearers, and if we graph their identity, we should understand automatically whether the statement is true or false. Thus, the statement should not be informative. Yet it is. The discovery that Hesperus Phosphorus was (in it's day) a great scientific achievement.

2. Empty names seem perfectly meaningful. Then whose identities do them reveal? If the only semantic function of a name is to tell us which individual a proposition is about, how can it tell us this when there is no such individual? There are many theories about proper name, none of them entirely satisfactory.

1. Traditional Theory

In traditional logic, proper names had no place al all. There were only two kinds of propositions: existential ("some men are philosopherǁ) and universal (−all men are mortal"). The subject of both consisted of a common name (−philosopher", "man") and a quantifier ("are", "some"). Proper names do not therefore signify any constituent of any proposition. Aquinas argued that this is because "the intellect" grasps a proposition, and the intellect understands by abstracting the " universal content" from sense perception. The " principle of singularity" that makes so rates this individual, we cannot grasp at all, except in directly, by "turning towards the sense appearance (conversion and phantasm). The obvious difficulty with the theory is that sentences containing names do seem to be informative, even when there is no object appearing to the senses.

2. Descriptive Theory

The descriptive theory of proper names is the view that the meaning of a given use of a proper name is a set of properties that can be expressed as a description that picks out an object that satisfies the description. It is commonly helping that fridge help such a view - the description being embedded in what he called the sense of the name. Certainly, Russell seems to have espoused such a view in his early philosophical career. So, according to the descriptivist theory of meaning, there's a description of the sense of proper names, and that description, like a definition, picks out the bearer of the name. The distinction between the embedded description and the bearer itself is similar to that between the extension of a general term, or between connotation and denotation. The extension of a general term like "dog" is just all the dogs that are out there; the extension is what the word can be used to refer to the intension of a general term is basically a description of what all dogs have in common; it's what the definition express.

The difficulty with the descriptive theory is what the description corresponds to. It must be some essential characteristic of the bearer; otherwise we could use the name to deny the bearer had such a characteristic. The objections associated with Kripke, although philosophers such as Bradley, Locke and Aristotle had already noticed the problem.

3. Referential Theory

The referential theory is that the meaning of proper name is simply the individual to which, in the context of it's use, the name refers. Another name for the theory is the "Fido" refers to, or denotes, or picks out, well, Fido So, the name "Fido" means the

dog Fido. But now wait a minute. Lots of dogs have been named "Fido". Lots of people have been named "Larry". The referential theory talks about proper names as though there's only one thing that any proper name, such as " Fido", can mean Right It says; the meaning of a proper name is the individual", that one item," to which it refer. But then isn`t that wrong, to say that a proper name like "Fido" can mean any one dog in particular Not really, because when we use proper names, we usually understand by the total context which individual we're using the proper names to pick out. So, when I said that the name "Larry" means me, you all understood, of course that when I the name "Larry" it means one of the gazillions of guys named "Larry". But just to be clear, let's update the statement of the referential theory, so it includes this stuff about context.

It might be the case that the name "Fido" picks out lots of different dogs; but a given use of the name refers to just one of the animals named "Fido".

4. Causal Theory of Names

The causal theory of names combines the referential view, with idea that the name's referent is fixed by a baptismal act, where upon the name becomes a rigid designator of the referent. Subsequent uses of the name succeed in referring proper name has the referent that it.

Having provided the research we come to a conclusion that anthroponyms play the great role in the language system and they belong to special linguistic units. They express the speaker's attitude to reality and his certain characteristics and features. Many famous linguists have been interested in the question of functioning and place of anthroponyms. Nowadays it is steel to be actual too. Anthroponyms serve as the important elements of a fiction text because they have certain stylistic and expressive functions. The English anthroponomy system has certain peculiarities that are realized in its structure and functionality. That is why it is very important to point out the lexical and cultural ground of anthroponyms. The perspective for further investigation may be the deeper research of the functionality of anthroponyms in another literary styles.

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